Pre-conventions and normative facts in contemporary legal theory

Abstract

This review article analyzes the state of the art of the debate on pre-conventions and normative facts in contemporary legal theory. The central axis is the persistent tension between the factual (descriptive) and normative (prescriptive) dimensions of law. It examines the canonical solutions of Kelsen (the presupposed Grundnorm) and Hart (the internal point of view), and delves into Bruno Celano's Incompatibility Thesis, which questions how pre-conventions can simultaneously be causal facts and possess “normative bite”. The discussion also addresses critiques of reducibility (Marmor) and the search for semantic autonomy. Finally, emerging frontiers are integrated, such as empirical evidence on normative cognition and the disruptive challenge of algorithmic regulation. It is concluded that the field is moving toward a necessary interdisciplinary integration, combining jurisprudence with formal logic and computational sciences.